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Sunday
Jan312010

Obama's Shifting Stance on Nuclear Power

I don't know that Obama has ever been opposed to nuclear power, but he did state explicitly during his campaign that he is not a proponent of it. Apparently that has changed -- check these quotes:

Two years ago during his campaign:  (see the video)
"I start off with the premise that nuclear power is not optimal, and so I am not a nuclear energy proponent. Until we can make certain that nuclear power plants are safe, that they have solved the storage problem, until we solve those problems and the nuclear industry can show that they can produce clean, safe energy without enormous subsidies from the U.S. government, I don’t think that’s the best option."  (December 30, 2007)

Last week at the State of the Union address:
"But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more production, more efficiency, more incentives.  And that means building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country.  (Applause.)  It means making tough decisions about opening new offshore areas for oil and gas development.  (Applause.)  It means continued investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies.  (Applause.)  (January 27, 2010)

So that's the clean energy plan -- nukes, oil, gas, coal and advanced biofuels? Get a clue, man! The enthusiastic applause from the gallery should be your clue that the fix is already in on nukes. That, despite the fact that MoveOn determined that his call for new nuke plants was the low point of the speech in the public's eye.

Congress just voted to give the nuclear power industry another $54 billion in loan guarantees, so the plan is to start building in 2011.

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Here's something I just received on 'Integral fast reactors' ...the introduction below and a link for the remainder...

http://www.energybulletin.net/49949
Published Aug 1 2009 by Friends of the Earth, Archived Aug 25 2009
Nuclear Weapons and 'Fourth Generation' Nuclear Power
by Jim Green

'Integral fast reactors' and other 'fourth generation' nuclear power concepts have been gaining attention, in part because of comments by US climate scientist James Hansen. While not a card-carrying convert, Hansen argues for more research: "We need hard-headed evaluation of how to get rid of long-lived nuclear waste and minimize dangers of proliferation and nuclear accidents. Fourth generation nuclear power seems to have the potential to solve the waste problem and minimize the others."

Others are less circumspect, with one advocate of integral fast reactors promoting them as the "holy grail" in the fight against global warming. There are two main problems with these arguments. Firstly, nuclear power could at most make a modest contribution to climate change abatement, mainly because it is used almost exclusively for electricity generation which accounts for about one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions. Doubling global nuclear power output (at the expense of coal) would reduce greenhouse emissions by about 5%. Building six nuclear power reactors in Australia (at the expense of coal) would reduce Australia's emissions by just 4%.

The second major problem with the nuclear 'solution' to climate change is that all nuclear power concepts (including 'fourth generation' concepts) fail to address the single greatest problem with nuclear power − its repeatedly-demonstrated connection to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Not just any old WMDs but nuclear weapons − the most destructive, indiscriminate and immoral of all weapons.

Read the entire article at:
http://www.energybulletin.net/49949
February 2, 2010 | Unregistered Commenteraquafir
Thorium Fuel: No Panacea for Nuclear Power
By Arjun Makhijani and Michele Boyd

A Fact Sheet Produced by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Thorium “fuel” has been proposed as an alternative to uranium fuel in nuclear reactors.
There are not “thorium reactors,” but rather proposals to use thorium as a “fuel” in
different types of reactors, including existing light‐water reactors and various fast breeder
reactor designs.

Thorium, which refers to thorium‐232, is a radioactive metal that is about three times more
abundant than uranium in the natural environment. Large known deposits are in Australia,
India, and Norway. Some of the largest reserves are found in Idaho in the U.S. The primary
U.S. company advocating for thorium fuel is Thorium Power (www.thoriumpower.com).
Contrary to the claims made or implied by thorium proponents, however, thorium doesn’t
solve the proliferation, waste, safety, or cost problems of nuclear power, and it still faces
major technical hurdles for commercialization.

Not a Proliferation Solution

Thorium is not actually a “fuel” because it is not fissile and therefore cannot be used to start
or sustain a nuclear chain reaction. A fissile material, such as uranium‐235 (U‐235) or
plutonium‐239 (which is made in reactors from uranium‐238), is required to kick‐start the
reaction. The enriched uranium fuel or plutonium fuel also maintains the chain reaction
until enough of the thorium target material has been converted into fissile uranium‐233 (U‐
233) to take over much or most of the job. An advantage of thorium is that it absorbs slow
neutrons relatively efficiently (compared to uranium‐238) to produce fissile uranium‐233.
The use of enriched uranium or plutonium in thorium fuel has proliferation implications.

Although U‐235 is found in nature, it is only 0.7 percent of natural uranium, so the
proportion of U‐235 must be industrially increased to make “enriched uranium” for use in
reactors. Highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium are nuclear weapons
materials.

In addition, U‐233 is as effective as plutonium‐239 for making nuclear bombs. In most
proposed thorium fuel cycles, reprocessing is required to separate out the U‐233 for use in
fresh fuel. This means that, like uranium fuel with reprocessing, bomb‐making material is
separated out, making it vulnerable to theft or diversion. Some proposed thorium fuel
cycles even require 20% enriched uranium in order to get the chain reaction started in
existing reactors using thorium fuel. It takes 90% enrichment to make weapons‐usable
uranium, but very little additional work is needed to move from 20% enrichment to 90%
enrichment. Most of the separative work is needed to go from natural uranium, which ahs
0.7% uranium‐235 to 20% U‐235.

It has been claimed that thorium fuel cycles with reprocessing would be much less of a
proliferation risk because the thorium can be mixed with uranium‐238. In this case, fissile
uranium‐233 is also mixed with non‐fissile uranium‐238. The claim is that if the uranium‐
238 content is high enough, the mixture cannot be used to make bombs without a complex
uranium enrichment plant. This is misleading. More uranium‐238 does dilute the
uranium‐233, but it also results in the production of more plutonium‐239 as the reactor
operates. So the proliferation problem remains – either bomb‐usable uranium‐233 or
bomb‐usable plutonium is created and can be separated out by reprocessing.

Further, while an enrichment plant is needed to separate U‐233 from U‐238, it would take
less separative work to do so than enriching natural uranium. This is because U‐233 is five
atomic weight units lighter than U‐238, compared to only three for U‐235. It is true that
such enrichment would not be a straightforward matter because the U‐233 is contaminated
with U‐232, which is highly radioactive and has very radioactive radionuclides in its decay
chain. The radiation‐dose‐related problems associated with separating U‐233 from U‐238
and then handling the U‐233 would be considerable and more complex than enriching
natural uranium for the purpose of bomb making. But in principle, the separation can be
done, especially if worker safety is not a primary concern; the resulting U‐233 can be used
to make bombs. There is just no way to avoid proliferation problems associated with
thorium fuel cycles that involve reprocessing. Thorium fuel cycles without reprocessing
would offer the same temptation to reprocess as today’s once‐through uranium fuel cycles.

Not a Waste Solution

Proponents claim that thorium fuel significantly reduces the volume, weight and long‐term
radiotoxicity of spent fuel. Using thorium in a nuclear reactor creates radioactive waste
that proponents claim would only have to be isolated from the environment for 500 years,
as opposed to the irradiated uranium‐only fuel that remains dangerous for hundreds of
thousands of years. This claim is wrong. The fission of thorium creates long‐lived fission
products like technetium‐99 (half‐life over 200,000 years). While the mix of fission
products is somewhat different than with uranium fuel, the same range of fission products
is created. With or without reprocessing, these fission products have to be disposed of in a
geologic repository.

If the spent fuel is not reprocessed, thorium‐232 is very‐long lived (half‐life:14 billion
years) and its decay products will build up over time in the spent fuel. This will make the
spent fuel quite radiotoxic, in addition to all the fission products in it. It should also be
noted that inhalation of a unit of radioactivity of thorium‐232 or thorium‐228 (which is
also present as a decay product of thorium‐232) produces a far higher dose, especially to
certain organs, than the inhalation of uranium containing the same amount of radioactivity.
For instance, the bone surface dose from breathing the an amount (mass) of insoluble
thorium is about 200 times that of breathing the same mass of uranium.

Finally, the use of thorium also creates waste at the front end of the fuel cycle. The
radioactivity associated with these is expected to be considerably less than that associated
with a comparable amount of uranium milling. However, mine wastes will pose long‐term
hazards, as in the case of uranium mining. There are also often hazardous non‐radioactive
metals in both thorium and uranium mill tailings.

Ongoing Technical Problems

Research and development of thorium fuel has been undertaken in Germany, India, Japan,
Russia, the UK and the U.S. for more than half a century. Besides remote fuel fabrication
and issues at the front end of the fuel cycle, thorium‐U‐233 breeder reactors produce fuel
(“breed”) much more slowly than uranium‐plutonium‐239 breeders. This leads to
technical complications. India is sometimes cited as the country that has successfully
developed thorium fuel. In fact, India has been trying to develop a thorium breeder fuel
cycle for decades but has not yet done so commercially.

One reason reprocessing thorium fuel cycles haven’t been successful is that uranium‐232
(U‐232) is created along with uranium‐233. U‐232, which has a half‐life of about 70 years,
is extremely radioactive and is therefore very dangerous in small quantities: a single small
particle in a lung would exceed legal radiation standards for the general public. U‐232 also
has highly radioactive decay products. Therefore, fabricating fuel with U‐233 is very
expensive and difficult.

Not an Economic Solution

Thorium may be abundant and possess certain technical advantages, but it does not mean
that it is economical. Compared to uranium, thorium fuel cycle is likely to be even more
costly. In a once‐through mode, it will need both uranium enrichment (or plutonium
separation) and thorium target rod production. In a breeder configuration, it will need
reprocessing, which is costly. In addition, as noted, inhalation of thorium‐232 produces a
higher dose than the same amount of uranium‐238 (either by radioactivity or by weight).
Reprocessed thorium creates even more risks due to the highly radioactive U‐232 created
in the reactor. This makes worker protection more difficult and expensive for a given level
of annual dose.

Finally, the use of thorium also creates waste at the front end of the fuel cycle. The
radioactivity associated with these is expected to be considerably less than that associated
with a comparable amount of uranium milling. However, mine wastes will pose long‐term
hazards, as in the case of uranium mining. There are also often hazardous non‐radioactive
metals in both thorium and uranium mill tailings.

Fact sheet completed in January 2009
Updated July 2009
February 2, 2010 | Unregistered Commenteraquafir
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